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Commentary and Reply
On ”The ’Practice’ Problem: Peacebuilding and
Doctrine”
Raymond D. “Boz” Bossert Jr.
This commentary responds to Christopher H. Tuck’s article “The ‘Practice’ Problem:
Peacebuilding and Doctrine” published in the Summer 2016 issue of Parameters (vol. 46,
no. 2).

D

r. Tuck’s article highlights several challenges inherent in defense
support of stabilizing weak and failed states. Unfortunately, the
article fails to offer solutions to improve these efforts or future
planning. Not only is Tuck reluctant to identify and address planning
dilemmas, but his definition of stability operations encompasses three
seemingly interchangeable meanings: nation-building, state-building, and
peacebuilding. This usage creates a problem. The terms used in his article
are not interchangeable and mean different things, at least they should.
Nation-building refers to constructing a national identity using the
power of the state. State-building influences the security, political, and
economic dimensions. Peacebuilding denotes actions that identify and
support structures that strengthen and solidify peace to prevent relapse
into conflict. Thus, the three terms are not synonymous.
Over the past two decades, state-building, the focus of this argument,
has become a specific stabilization approach of the international
community. Internationally-led state-building has three dimensions:
security, politics, and economics. Of these, security—creating a safe
and secure environment to make comprehensive political and economic
development possible—is almost always considered the first priority.1
The security aspect is inherently a military and police function requiring
some form of doctrine or handbook contrary to the assertions previously presented.
Tuck’s “planning school” discussion assumes the stabilization
approach is inherently defective. Having been personally involved in
updating our current Joint and Army doctrine on stability operations, I
can guarantee that we do not create cut-and-paste approaches to how the
United States should conduct stabilization tasks and I welcome Tuck’s
thoughts on improving the process.2 Stability operations are the current
that flows throughout our engagement in another state; they are neither
upstream nor downstream of other actions or decisions, but constant.
Tuck notes President Obama’s position: “American isolationism is
not an option. . . . But a strategy that involves invading every country
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that harbors terrorist networks is naive and unsustainable.”3 Thus,
America should focus on building the capacity of local partners. In fact,
building partner capacity is already a key, albeit challenging, part of stability operations, which seek to build effective and accountable public
institutions, including those in the security sector.
In regards to Tuck’s thoughts on building democratic states, I agree
with his analysis and examples; however, he fails to provide historical
examples of success or offer solutions. Would he grant that planning can
entail a dynamic, flexible, and open-minded approach to how we engage
in stabilization rather than a closed, ethnocentric, and othewise biased
one? Good planning should drive stabilization practitioners to be more
sensitive and aware of the myriad issues that confront a fragile state, and
thus understand those issues even if they contradict the values of the
countries contributing to security efforts.
While Tuck’s article highlights many key dilemmas and issues
worthy of expanded treatment, ultimate success is a result of learned
experiences, for better or worse, that help us innovate our practices.
Many of our military and interagency partners have been struggling with stabilization missions for decades, but progress has been
made. Dynamic senior leadership—characterized by accepting
risk, respecting local customs and cultures, emphasizing change over
time, and engaging in stability early, often, and always, as well as
preventing one-size-fits-all or Western approaches to every situation—
will strengthen future missions. The willingness of the intervening
nation’s government and populace, host-nation “buy-in,” and an understanding that the mission will take time to be successful are also required.

The Author Replies
Christopher H. Tuck

I

would like to thank COL Bossert for his thoughtful comments on my
article “The ‘Practice’ Problem: Peacebuilding and Doctrine.” In the
context of such crises as those in Syria, the topic of peacebuilding is
one that merits continued reflection and debate.
Bossert’s critique revolves around three related themes: that I have
implied that planning for peacebuilding operations is pointless; that
I am, in effect, advocating isolationism; and that my article does not
provide planning solutions to the problems it identifies. Let me take
these points in order.
On the first issue, it is important to understand I am not criticizing
the military for preparing as best it can for peacebuilding operations.
Indeed, while peacebuilding may be out of fashion, there is no guarantee
the military will not again be tasked by governments to conduct such
operations. Military organizations have no choice but to prepare for
3     
US President Barack Obama, “Remarks” (speech, United States Military Academy
Commencement Ceremony, West Point, NY, May 28, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the
-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement
-ceremony.
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these activities. Nor, do I say in my article the military only “cuts and
pastes” its approaches.
But I ask whether success in peacebuilding activities is “simply a
matter of getting the right principles and honing tactical and operational
methods.” My answer is we cannot assume the processes of producing a better doctrine actually will improve outcomes for peacebuilding
operations because there is no wider consensus on whether or how these
operations should be conducted. This position is an expression of the
wider distinction between tactical and operational excellence on the one
hand and strategic performance on the other. We simply do not know
objectively if successful peacebuilding is possible, or whether top-down
liberal approaches are the right means to achieve it. It may be that no
amount of tactical military acumen will bring success.
So, to answer Bossert’s question, yes; I would “grant that planning can entail a dynamic, flexible, and open-minded approach to
how we engage in stabilization rather than a closed, ethnocentric,
biased one.” I would hope the former would be the preferred choice,
but the point of my article is that even it may ultimately make no
difference to the overall outcome. If peacebuilding cannot be done, good
doctrine may simply mask failure longer. On that basis, I would probably
disagree with Bossert that “ultimate success is a result of learned experiences—for better or for worse—that help us innovate our practices.”
Leaving aside the practical and conceptual problems surrounding the
notion of learning lessons, if Bossert’s statement were true, our prior
accumulation of experience would have led us to much more success in
peacebuilding than we have recently experienced.
On the second theme, given my skepticism, Bossert notes my argument implies an isolationist stance. Actually, my article does not argue
for isolation; rather it says we should expect less from peacebuilding
operations, and future performance in such operations is unlikely to
improve radically. To argue peacebuilding is likely to remain highly
problematic is not to argue that it cannot be used.
The final critique is I do not provide a set of recommendations
for military practitioners. This is entirely true and for an organization
focused on producing doctrine for stability operations, would indeed be
a frustrating and possibly alienating outcome. But this criticism misinterprets the purpose of my article. Explicitly, my article says “there is no
consensus on the practice of complex nation-building” and “the difficulties derive from fundamental uncertainties about whether such
operations can be done at all.” To put it another way, my article does not
provide answers because it sets out to show that we cannot even agree
on the questions.

